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December 9, 1987 
Mr. Geoffrey Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
RE: Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority 
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services 
Case No.: 870187 
The recent case of RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Ind. 
Comm. , 63 Ut. Adv. Reports 12 (Case No. 860003, August 13, 
1987) is additional authority for Point III, Section 2 of 
Brief of Respondent (p. 11). 
Specifically, RDG Assoc, states: 
We agree that a strictly literal inter-
pretation of the statute could produce results 
which would be absurd and hence were not, in 
our view, intended. Consequently, the literal 
scope of the statute must be narrowed. Millett 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1980) Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978); Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 
2d 254, 255, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964). 
Will you please bring this letter to the attention 
of the court? 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Carol seeks judgment that Medicaid is entitled to 
no reimbursement. Alternativelyf Carol seeks to have the 
trial court's award of $3,280 upheld. Additionally, Carol 
seeks to have the case remanded for a redetermination of 
attorney fees paid by Medicaid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case was submitted to the trial court upon 
stipulated facts, and upon the affidavits of Sharon 
Cavagnolo, Donna Harmon, and Robert Hansen. The affidavits 
are uncontradicted. The facts in defendant's brief are the 
stipulated facts. The additional facts contained in the 
affidavits are set forth as follows: 
The claim against Farmers was first made on August 
5, 1985; Farmers offered $20,000 policy limits on September 
3, 1985. (R.96.) The settlement was conditioned on 
verification that Carol was the administrator of Tammy 
Kadel's estate. Upon verification, the settlement draft was 
issued to "Carol Camp as administrator of the estate of 
Tammy Kadel and her legal guardian." (R.97.) The 
settlement was understood to include medical expenses, pain, 
suffering, disfigurement, and loss of future earnings as 
damages. (R.96; 9 3-94.) 
The settlement was made before Medicaid paid any 
bills, or obligated itself to pay them. In fact, Farmers 
and Carol's attorneys were completely unaware that Medicaid 
would eventually become involved. (R.98; 137.) 
The settlement compensated only a fraction of the 
damages suffered by Carol. (R.126.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
AT POINT I 
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL) 
Medicaid's statutory right of reimbursement is 
inapplicable because Medicaid had not paid, or become 
obligated to pay, benefits at the time the claim was made. 
Without a statutory lien, Medicaid's claim is governed by 
common-law subrogation. Because plaintiff was not made 
whole, Medicaid has no common law rights. 
AT POINT II 
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL) 
Medicaid is barred by statute from recovering from 
the estate of a deceased recipient under 65. Because Tammy 
Kadel was under 65, Medicaid has no statutory claim. 
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AT POINT III 
Because Medicaid's right of reimbursement is 
triggered only to the extent that medical expenses are 
claimed and recovered, the trial court correctly apportioned 
the settlement. The allocation is not claimed, nor shown, to 
be erroneous or unfounded• 
AT POINT IV 
The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and 
costs of the underlying lawsuit from Medicaid's recovery. 
The claim was made before Medicaid paid became obligated to 
pay medical benefits, and was therefore in compliance with 
the statute. Furthermore, the common fund doctrine requires 
Medicaid to pay a reasonable attorney fee from the benefits 
it receives. 
AT POINT V 
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL) 
The trial court erred in determining the attorney 
fees award by failing to consider the risks taken by 
plaintiff's counsel, skill of counsel and other factors. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MEDICAID'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO RECOVER IS INAPPLICABLE 
a. Plaintiff did not violate 26-19-7(1)(a) because 
the claim was made, and settlement reached, before 
Medicaid provided, or became obligated to provide 
medical assistance. 
Medicaid's right to recover is limited to cases 
where a claim is made against a third party after Medicaid 
has paid, or became obligated to pay, medical expenses: 
(L)(a) A recipient may not file a claim 
or commence an action against a third 
party for recovery of medical costs for 
an injury, disease, or disability for 
which the department has provided or has 
become obligated to provide medical 
assistance without the department's 
written consent. 
* * * * 
(2) If the recipient proceeds without 
the department's written consent as 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the 
department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise 
rendered or made on the claim or in the 
action, and the department may recover 
in full from the recipient all medical 
assistance which it has provided and 
shall maintain its right to commence an 
independent action against the third 
party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
Medicaid bears the burden of showing that the statutory right 
of recovery, under 2(a), is applicable. However, there was 
no evidence that Medicaid had paid, or promised to pay 
medical benefits, before the claim was made. The claim 
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was made on August 5, 1985, and the settlement concluded by 
October 4, 1985. Medicaid did not pay medical benefits until 
some months after the settlement. Thus, because Medicaid has 
failed to show that the statute is applicable, they should be 
denied recovery pursuant to statute. 
Furthermore, the statute apparently contemplates a 
situation where Medicaid has paid medical expenses prior to 
the assertion of a third party claim. If Medicaid has made 
no payments, there is no reason to get consent. There is 
nothing to consent to. Only after Medicaid has paid, is 
there any reimbursement claim for which consent can be given. 
This approach is consistent with a general policy 
of encouraging injured persons to seek and exhaust private 
sources of paying medical bills before turning to public 
assistance. For example, consider an injured person who 
incurs $50,000 in medical expenses due to the negligence of a 
tortfeasor with $20,000 in insurance. The injured person 
recovers the $20,000 to pay medical bills, then turns to 
Medicaid who pays the rest. According to Medicaid's theory, 
because the injured person proceeded without Medicaid's 
consent (even though Medicaid had paid nothing at that time), 
the injured person is liable to reimburse the State for the 
full $30,000 in assistance received. Thus, the injured 
person winds up paying the whole $50,000. A prudent injured 
person wou]d avoid this absurd result by simply asking 
Medicaid to pay the whole $50,000 and let Medicaid seek 
third-party recovery. However, a better result is achieved 
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with less drain on public largess when the injured person is 
encouraged to seek private funds before turning to Medicaid. 
A literal reading of the statute is in harmony with that 
policy. Because Medicaid had not paid medical bills when 
Carol made her claim, Medicaid has no statutory right to 
reimbursement. 
b. Without a statutory lien, Medicaid can 
only assert common-law subrogation. 
Because Medicaid's statutory right of recovery is 
inapplicable, common law principles of subrogation apply. 
Under these familiar principles, Medicaid is not entitled to 
recovery until Carol is made whole. Lyon v. Hartford Ace. & 
Indem. Co., 25 Ut.2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971); Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Ut.2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972). See 
also the following, which apply subrogation to Medicaid 
claims: Smith v.Alabama Medicaid Agency, 461 So.2d 817 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1984); White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331 
(N.M. App. 1978); Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J. 
1977); State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. App. 1981) 
(superseded by statute). Carol was not made whole by the 
settlement. Thus, Medicaid has no common law right of 
reimbursement. 
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POINT II 
MEDICAID IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE 
FROM RECOVERING FROM TAMMY KADEL'S ESTATE 
a. By statute, Medicaid can only recover 
from the estate of a person over 65. 
Utah Code Ann., §26-19-13(2) expressly limits 
Medicaid's right of recovery from the estate of a Medicaid 
recipient to estates of recipients "65 years of age or older 
when [the recipient] received assistance. . ." Section 
26-19-13(1) dealing with recovery from living persons is 
clearly subordinated to §26-19-7 (regarding third-party 
claims). In contrast, §26-19-13(2)(recovery from estates) is 
not subordinated to, or limited by, Medicaid's right of 
recovery under §26-19-7. 
The apparent legislative intent is to recognize 
hardship cases and exempt monies in the estate of a formerly 
indigent person. For example, a widow with young children 
would not be required to reimburse Medicaid from settlement 
proceeds from a survival action. The distinction between 
recovering from an estate of a person over 65, and not 
allowing recovery from an estate of a person under 65, is 
perfectly rational and appropriate for the legislature to 
make. See Matter of Estate of Fisher, 397 A.2d 738 (N.J. 
Super., Probate Part. 1978). 
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Medicaid's rights of recovery are created by 
statute. If §26-19-13(2) fails to confer a right of 
recovery against the estate of a deceased recipient under 65, 
this Court should not judicially create one, apart from 
common law subrogation. 
b. The settlement is part of the estate of 
Tammy Kadel. •*• 
Defendant's argument that the settlement is not 
part of Tammy Kadel's estate is misguided. The settlement 
draft is drawn to "Carol Camp as administrator of the estate 
of Tammy Kadel and her legal guardian." While a wrongful 
death claim is not part of the estate of the deceased, In 
Re: Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151 213 P.2d 657 (1950), Tammy 
had a survival action for her pain and suffering and other 
damages suffered by her before and upon her death. Utah 
Code Ann., §78-11-12 (1977). This survival action is a part 
of the estate. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, §14.1, 
(2d ed. 1975); Runyon v. Dist. of Col., 150 App. D.C. 228, 
463 F.2d 1319 (1972). The settlement draft makes no 
reference to Carol Camp in her capacity as an heir under the 
Wrongful Death Statute; it expressly designates her as 
LThe argument raised by Medicaid that the settlement 
was not part of Tammy's estate was not raised in the trial 
court below. Therefore, the argument is not properly before 
the court. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986); 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986). 
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administrator of the estate. Therefore, the settlement was a 
part of the estate, and not subject to Medicaid's claim. 
Medicaid cites Shelton v. Fresno Community Hosp., 
219 Cal.Rptr. 722 (Cal.App. 5th Dist. 1985) for the 
proposition that the settlement is not part of Tammy's 
estate. Shelton involved a wrongful death claim by heirs, 
not a survival action on behalf of the estate. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §26-19-1, ET SEQ. 
REQUIRES APPORTIONMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT BE-
TWEEN MEDICAL EXPENSES AND OTHER DAMAGES 
1. Medicaid's consent is only required for recovery of 
medical costs by Carol. 
A Medicaid recipient may make a claim for recovery 
of "medical costs" against a third party only with the 
consent of Medicaid. Utah Code Ann., §26-19-7(1)(a) (1984). 
However, if the recipient claims for general damages only, or 
for special damages not including medical costs, Medicaid's 
consent is apparently not required. Icl. Additionally, 
§26-19-5(5) clearly preserves the recipient's right to seek 
damages not paid by Medicaid. Thus, any claim Carol made for 
non-medical and general damages did not require Medicaid's 
consent. 
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2. Medicaid's right of recovery is triggered only by a 
recovery of medical expenses by Carol. 
The trial court reasonably construed the statute to 
require a showing of recovery of medical expenses before 
allowing reimbursement. By doing so, the court harmonized 
medicaid's right of recovery with the statute's preservation 
of the recipient's claim for other damages (§26-19-5(5)). It 
is appropriate to construe all aspects of a statute together 
so that no individual provision is rendered ineffectual. 
Peay v. Bd. of Educ. of Provo City School Dist., 14 Ut.2d 63, 
577 P.2d 490 (1962); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Ut.2d 175, 397 
P.2d 984 (1965) . 
A wooden reading of the statute would allow 
Medicaid to demand reimbursement for medical costs whenever a 
third-party claim is made by the recipient, regardless of any 
actual recovery. Section 26-19-7 requires consent before 
making a claim; the penalty (reimbursement) is triggered 
merely by lack of consent. Thus, under Medicaid's 
construction, if a plaintiff sought medical costs and general 
damages, but the jury failed to award medical expenses, 
Medicaid could still recover "in fullM from a general damage 
award, simply because the recipient proceeded without 
consent. Indeed, the plaintiff might lose entirely; however, 
Medicaid will still require reimbursement simply because a 
claim for medical expenses was made without its consent. 
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Alternatively, a jury may award only a portion of 
the medical expenses claimed to be a result of the accident. 
Medicaid's interpretation would allow recovery of the entire 
amount claimed, regardless of the amount actually recovered. 
The trial court's decision to limit reimbursement to Medicaid 
to the amount of medical expense recovered from a third party 
is consistent with the principle that a statute is not to be 
construed to give unjust or illogical results. Millett v. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980). 
Medicaid places great reliance on several Indiana 
cases. Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6 
(Ind. App. 4th Dist. 1984); Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare, 
486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. App. 3rd Dist. 1985). Because Indiana 
Code, 12-1-7-24.6 gives Medicaid a lien on "any recovery" 
from a third party, these cases are not helpful in analyzing 
Utah's statute which is limited to third-party recovery for 
"medical costs." 
Medicaid also cites in support of its position 
Coplien v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 349 N.W.2d 92 
(Wis.App. 1984). Coplien considered a statutory scheme for 
disbursement of a third party recovery which specifically 
provided for full reimbursement to Medicaid in every case. 
This is in sharp contrast to Utah's approach which only 
requires reimbursement if medical costs are claimed. 
Finally, this court should reject Medicaid's 
panic-stricken argument that Medicaid recipients who do not 
seek medical costs will prevent recovery of medical costs by 
Medicaid. Section 26-19-7 allows Medicaid to seek 
reimbursement from a third party despite a prior or 
concurrent recovery of non-medical costs by the recipient. 
3. The trial court's allocation of the settlement between 
medical and non-medical expenses is not clearly 
erroneous. 
Having required a showing that medical costs were 
actually recovered, the trial court was faced with the 
difficult factual question of whether, and to what extent, a 
recovery for medical costs had been obtained. For Carol's 
claim against Farmers was not simply a claim for medical 
costs. Her claim included the pain and suffering of Tammy 
for six days before her death. It also included the grief 
and anguish she suffered as a mother watching her daughter 
die. It also encompassed Tammy's lost future earnings, and 
all other compensable elements of damage. 
Because Carol and Farmers had not allocated any 
portion of the recovery to medical expenses, the trial court 
assigned a pro-rata portion of the settlement to medical 
expenses. Carol was ordered to repay this amount to 
Medicaid. Medicaid has not challenged the trial court's 
determiantion as to the total value of Carol's claim, and the 
percentage of that value that represents medical expenses. 
4• Medicaid's reimbursement should be based on the actual 
amount it has paid. 
Medicaid points out that its payments are about 16 
percent of the total settlement, while the face amount of the 
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medical expenses is about 36 percent of the settlement. The 
difference arises because Medicaid pays only a portion of the 
medical expenses. The medical care provider agrees to waive 
or compromise the excess as a condition of Medicaid's 
payment* Medicaid seeks to have its share based on the face 
amount of the medical expenses instead of the actual amount 
paid by it- However, §26-19-5(1) and §26-19-7(2) only allow 
recovery for medical assistance provided, but do not include 
medical expenses waived by medical care providers• For this 
reason, the trial court limited Medicaid's recovery to the 
amount it actually paid, or 16%. 
Medicaid's argument would allow it to pay $25,000 
in satisfaction of $50,000 in medical bills and then recover 
the full $50,000 from the tortfeasor or the recipient. This 
would be an improper result that in effect allows Medicaid to 
make a profit out of its charitable obligation. The trial 
court properly rejected this illogical construction of the 
statute. 
POINT IV 
MEDICAID'S DEFENDANT'S RECOVERY SHOULD BE REDUCED 
BY A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE AND COSTS 
U.C.A. §26-19-7(4) states that Medicaid "shall pay 
its proportionate share of the costs of any action. . . . 
The statute also allows an attorney fee not to exceed 
one-third of Medicaid's recovery. While it is not expressly 
stated, the implication is that "costs" includes a reasonable 
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attorney's fee not to exceed one-third of Medicaid's 
recovery. This makes sense because attorney fees are a cost 
to a recipient of producing the recovery in which Medicaid 
shares. 
Medicaid's recovery should be reduced by a 
reasonable attorney fee on equitable principles apart from 
the statutory language. This reduction is based in the 
inherent equitable power of the court under the "common fund" 
doctrine. Under this doctrine, where a party creates a fund 
through litigation in which others benefit, a reasonable 
attorney fee is deducted from the share given to each party. 
The [common fund] doctrine rests on the 
perception that persons who obtain the 
benefits of a lawsuit without 
contributing to its cost are unjustly 
enriched at the successful litigant's 
expense. [Citation omitted.] 
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 487, 100 S.Ct. 745, 
749, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980). See also, Turtle Mgt., Inc. v. 
Haggis Mgt., 645 P.2d 667, 671 fn.l (Utah 1982) (recognizing 
common fund doctrine and its rationale). See generally, 
Dawson, "Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees 
from Funds," 87 Harvard L. Rev. 1597 (1974). 
This principle underlies the well-known rule that 
an insurer who seeks subrogation from its insured must pay a 
reasonable attorney fee from its recovery. See Guaranty 
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 1980); Street 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1980); Lamb v. 
S.Cen. Utah Tel. Ass'n., Inc., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
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Even if this case does not involve a true subrogation right, 
the same principles should be applicable. 
The common fund doctrine has been applied to 
require other states to share in paying the attorney fees 
necessary to procure a settlement from which a Medicaid 
reimbursement claim is satisfied. In requiring Medicaid to 
pay a proportionate share of the plaintiff's attorney fees, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated; 
Where, despite a clear right to proceed 
in its own right against the tortfeasor, 
the Commonwealth refrains from acting 
and it is the attorney for the welfare 
recipient who creates the fund from 
which the Commonwealth will benefit as 
subrogee, equity requires that the 
Commonwealth share in the cost of 
creating the fund., It would be 
manifestly unjust to permit the 
Commonwealth to recover its entire claim 
and permit it to avoid any part of the 
cost of creating the fund while 
requiring the welfare recipient to pay a 
disproportionately large share. 
Shearer v. Moore, 419 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa. Super. 1980) 
(Emphasis added); Accord, see Moss v. Glynn, 383 N.E.2d 275 
(111. 1978); Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1911)} 
White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331 (1978). 
Medicaid argues that it should not pay attorney 
fees because Carol failed to get its consent. As pointed 
out at Point I, above, consent was not required because 
Medicaid had not paid anything when Carol obtained recovery. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina aptly 
summarized the entire situation as follows: 
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11 is repugnant to fundamental 
principles of equity that [parties 
receiving benefits] should reap where 
they have not sown, free from any legal 
duty to compensate those who have made 
reaping possible. 
Petition of Crum, 114 S.E.2d 21, 24 (S.C. 1941). Medicaid 
should bear a reasonable, proportionate share of Carol's 
attorney fees. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY A PROPORTIONATE 
SHARE OF PLAINTIFF'S COSTS IN "THE 
CLAIM AGAINST STEVENS 
U.C.A., §26-19-7(4) clearly requires Medicaid to 
pay a proportionate share of the costs of the underlying 
settlement. Medicaid claims that it has no obligation to 
pay costs because Carol's action was not commenced in 
compliance with the statute. However, Carol incurred the 
costs before Medicaid's consent was necessary. See Point I, 
supra. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING 
TO CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT FACTORS IN 
ASSESSING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE 
In determining the amount of attorney fees to be 
assessed against Medicaid, the trial court refused to 
consider all relevant factors. Despite a specific request, 
the court refused to consider the contingent nature of 
Carol's attorney's representation in calculating a reason-
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able attorney fee- Also, the court would not consider the 
skill and standing of Carol's attorneys- Instead, the trial 
court merely multiplied the hours spent by a reasonable 
hourly fee- (R.174-175-) 
Utah Code of Professional Responsibility DR-2-106 
provides: 
Factors to be considered as guides in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar legal 
services. 
* * * * 
(7) The experience, reputation, and 
ability of the lawyer- - -
• * * * 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent. 
These factors should be considered by a trial court in 
computing a reasonable fee- Cabrera v. Cobtrell, 694 P.2d 
622 (Utah 1985); Kerr v- Kerr, 610 P-2d 1380 (Utah 1980). 
Furthermore, this court has counselled against the 
mechanical use of hours spent times hourly rate: 
Reasonable attorney fees are not 
measured by what an attorney actually 
bills, nor is the number of hours spent 
on the case determinative in computing 
fees . 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d at 624. 
Many courts agree that the risk of litigation is 
an important factor when a case is accepted on a contingent 
fee. Heller v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, N.A., 657 P.2d 
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972 (Colo. App. 1982) (contingent fee contract is factor 
bearing on reasonable value of attorney's services); 
Jazarian v. Csapo, 483 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(complexity and risk, multiplier of 2); see generally, 57 
A.L.R.3d 475, §8 and Speiser, Attorney's Fees, §8.10, p. 
319, and cases cited therein.2 
The trial court's reason for not considering 
contingency of recovery and skill of counsel was that 
Medicaid had the services of the Attorney General at its 
disposal. Thus, the court concluded, because Medicaid could 
hire its own attorney and bear its own risk of litigation, 
no consideration to those factors should be given. But the 
availability of alternative counsel to Medicaid is not 
relevant" to the risk actually assumed by Carol's counsel. 
Likewise, the recognized skill of the Attorney General's 
office says nothing about the ability of counsel actually 
involved in the case. 
Accepting the trial court's reasoning would 
completely undercut the common fund doctrine, because any 
beneficiary could theoretically have hired a better 
attorney, and borne any risk individually. The fact is that 
the beneficiary has not hired counsel, but has accepted the 
benefit of the work of counsel of another. The work of the 
^The risk involved in a case is not always apparent at 
the beginning. In this case, what appeared to be a 
straightforward wrongful death action has turned into a 
complicated, drawn-out subrogation dispute. 
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attorney actually obtaining the recovery should be evaluated 
on its own, without regard to what another attorney might 
have done. 
CONCLUSION 
Medicaid should not recover from Carol because its 
statutory rights of reimbursement are inapplicable. 
Medicaid has no common law rights because common law 
subrogation requires that Carol be made whole before 
allowing recovery from her. 
Should recovery be allowed, the trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed. The trial court reasonably and 
fairly construed trie reimbursement statute to require 
Medicaid to show an a«tual recovery of medical costs from a 
third party before allowing reimbursement. The trial 
court's factual determination of the actual amount of 
medical cost recovery has not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous. 
If the trial court is affirmed on reimbursement, 
Cax-ol's attorney should be paid a reasonable attorney fee 
for Medicaid. This should be based not only on hours spent, 
but on the risk inherent in the case, the skill of counsel, 
and the other facts listed in DR 2-106. 
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